Risk of Cascading Blackouts Given Correlated Component Outages by Clarfeld, Laurence A. et al.
1Risk of Cascading Blackouts Given Correlated
Component Outages
Laurence A. Clarfeld, Paul D.H. Hines, Senior Member, IEEE
Eric M. Hernandez, and Margaret J. Eppstein.
Abstract—Cascading blackouts typically occur when nearly simultaneous outages occur in k out of N components in a power system,
triggering subsequent failures that propagate through the network and cause significant load shedding. While large cascades are rare,
their impact can be catastrophic, so quantifying their risk is important for grid planning and operation. A common assumption in
previous approaches to quantifying such risk is that the k initiating component outages are statistically independent events. However,
when triggered by a common exogenous cause, initiating outages may actually be correlated. Here, copula analysis is used to quantify
the impact of correlation of initiating outages on the risk of cascading failure. The method is demonstrated on two test cases; a
2383-bus model of the Polish grid under varying load conditions and a synthetic 10,000-bus model based on the geography of the
Western US. The large size of the Western US test case required development of new approaches for bounding an estimate of the total
number of N − 3 blackout-causing contingencies. The results suggest that both risk of cascading failure, and the relative contribution of
higher order contingencies, increase as a function of spatial correlation in component failures.
Index Terms—blackout risk, cascading failure, cascading outage, correlated outages, Random Chemistry.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
CASCADING power failures are typically initiated whena small number of k components in a power system
of N components disconnect nearly simultaneously, and
the subsequent rerouting of power flow triggers additional
component outages. This process continues until the system
reaches a state of equilibrium. While most cascades do
not propagate extensively throughout the network, the rare
cases when they do can cause massive blackouts affecting
millions of people. Due to their vast size and substantial
social and economic costs, the risk they pose to power
systems is significant [1], [2], [3].
Networks with heterogeneous load profiles, such as
power systems, are particularly prone to cascades; without
the right precautions, even a single node may trigger a
cascade [4]. To mitigate the risk posed by cascading fail-
ure, power systems are required to operate such that no
single component outage will cause a cascade (so-called N -
1 security). While grid planners and operators are now also
obligated to consider the risk of cascading failure due to
multiple contingencies (k > 1) [5], it is not yet clear how
to estimate this risk. For brevity, minimal N − k contin-
gencies that result in a cascading blackout are referred to
as “malignancies”, while contingencies that do not cause a
blackout are referred to as “benign” [6]. By “minimal”, we
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mean that no smaller subset of outages results in a blackout.
Analysis of high order malignancies is challenging due to
the nonlinear ways in which cascades propagate, the vast
number ofN−k malignancies, and the combinatorial search
space of possible contingencies.
In addition to helping to quantify risk of cascading
failure, studying N − k malignancies may potentially in-
form mitigating actions. For example, prior research into
a simple model of cascading overloads in communication
networks [7] suggests that the intentional removal of key
components directly after initiating sets of outages may
reduce the size of subsequent cascades. In a power system
model of the Polish grid, optimally dispatching generation
assuming a 50% reduction in line limits on the 3 branches
that contribute the most to the risk of cascades from N − 2
malignancies dramatically reduces the overall risk of cas-
cading failure with only a modest increase in operational
costs [8].
Many previous approaches to cascading failure risk
analysis (including our own) assumed initiating component
outages to be independent events [1], [8], [9], [10], [11].
However, N − k malignancies triggered by the same ex-
ogenous event, or “common cause”, represent a significant
source of risk to power systems [12], and can result in
spatial correlation in initiating outages. For example, ex-
treme weather events can result in spatially correlated dam-
age [13], protection system failures can sometimes cause
multiple outages within a small geographic region [14], and
terrorist attacks may be spatially localized, such as in the
2013 sniper attack on the Metcalf substation near San Jose,
CA, where the perpetrators shot 17 transformers at the same
substation [15]. Non-spatial attributes, such as component
age, may also induce correlations in component failures [16],
[17].
There is a dramatically increasing computational burden
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2to assessing risk for N − k malignancies as k increases, so it
is important to understand the degree to which higher-order
(k > 2) malignancies contribute to risk, and thus how im-
portant it is to consider them in risk estimation. Even though
there are many more N − 3 than N − 2 malignancies for
any given system, when there is no correlation in initiating
outages the probability ofN−3 malignancies occurring is so
much lower than that of N −2 malignancies that the impact
of N − 3 malignancies on risk is negligible [9]. However,
as correlation in component outages increases, the impact
of higher order malignancies on risk will increase. To what
degree should risk analysis take into account the conditional
probability of component failure, given a common cause?
There has been some prior work on ways to incorporate
correlation into risk analysis. In [18], correlation was incor-
porated by assuming 100% correlation of outages within
a fixed radius. In [13], spatial correlation was achieved by
determining outage rates of lines adjacent to initial failures
probabilistically, according to a Poisson process. In [19], a
random field with spatial autocorrelation was used in a
cascade model to assess risk from common-cause events.
Others [20] have simulated the impact of hidden relay
failures on cascading failure risk by allowing proximate
lines to trip probabilistically.
Another approach to incorporating correlation into risk
estimation is via copula analysis. Popularized in the field
of finance [21], copulas have been used in a wide vari-
ety of disciplines to model the co-dependence of multiple
variables [22], [23]. Within the realm of power systems,
copulas are a popular tool for uncertainty analysis. They
have been used in the modelling of stochastic generation,
such as wind [24], [25], [26]. The impacts of variable infeeds
on security assessment have also been considered using
copulas [27]. Li [28] suggests copulas as a useful way to
incorporate correlation between random variables in power
systems risk analysis.
A flexible and generalizable approach to risk estimation
given correlated component outages was presented in [29]
and used to estimate risk due to N − 2 malignancies in a
2383-bus model of the Polish grid. This paper extends that
work in several significant ways including: (i) incorporating
the effects of N − 3 malignancies, (ii) studying how the
risk due to N − 3, relative to N − 2, malignancies changes
as a function of correlation in outage probabilities, and
(iii) applying the method to a much larger and more geo-
graphically realistic 10,000-bus test case, which necessitated
(iv) development of new methods for estimating the total
number of N − 3 malignancies.
This paper is organized as follows: methods for risk
estimation using samples of N − k malignancies, and the
computationally efficient “Random Chemistry” (RC) sam-
pling method used in this work, are reviewed in Sections 2.1
and 2.2, respectively. In Section 2.3 a method using copula
analysis to incorporate initiating outage correlations into
risk estimation is presented, and in Section 2.4 an approach
to quantifying distance between transmission lines, when
considering spatial correlation, is described. The two test
cases used to demonstrate the method are described in
Section 2.5; new methods for bounding the total number
of N − 3 malignancies in large systems are described in Sec-
tion 2.6. Results and discussion are presented in Sections 3
and 4, respectively.
2 METHODS
2.1 Estimating Risk of Cascading Failure
This study uses the method for estimating risk of cascading
failure from sampled N − k malignancies presented in [9],
[11], briefly reviewed below.
The risk due to a set of branches (transmission lines or
transformers) ω can be calculated as [30]:
Rω = pωsω (1)
where pω is the joint probability of the branches in ω failing
and sω is the size of the resultant blackout. Note that pω is
itself a function of pi, the independent outage probability
for each branch i ∈ ω, as well as any effect of correlation
among branch outage probabilities (as further defined in
Section 2.3).
Blackout size sω is quantified as the total power (MW)
unserved due to load shedding. In this work, a cascading
blackout is considered to have occurred when 5% or more of
the total load is shed in DCSIMSEP, a simulator of cascading
outages in power systems [31]. The risk posed to the system
by allN−k malignancies comprising branches ω, for a given
k, is then:
Rk =
∑
ω∈Ωk
Rω (2)
where Ωk is the complete set of all N − k malignancies
for the specified k. For realistically-sized power systems
it is not computationally tractable to find the entire set
Ωk for k > 2. However, if Ω
sampled
k ⊂ Ωk is a large
and representative subset of size |Ωsampledk |, comprising all
unique N − k malignancies found by many iterations of
some sampling strategy, and if the size of the complete set
of N − k malignancies |Ωk| can be estimated, then risk Rˆk
associated with N − k malignancies, for a given k, can be
estimated as follows:
Rˆk =
|Ωk|
|Ωsampledk |
∑
ω∈Ωsampledk
Rω (3)
Estimating |Ωk| for k > 2 on large systems is itself a very
challenging problem, as discussed in Section 2.6.
Considering only malignancies with k ≤ kmax and as-
suming that non-minimal supersets of malignancies do not
substantially change the amount of load shed, as justified in
[9], the risk of cascading failure can be approximated as:
Rˆ =
∑
k∈{2..kmax}
Rˆk (4)
In this work, kmax = 3.
2.2 Random Chemistry Sampling
For each k, there are
(
N
k
)
possible N − k contingencies,
only a small proportion of which are malignancies. While
exhaustive search may be feasible (albeit time consuming)
for k = 2, it is computationally intractable for k > 2 in
large power systems. Thus, many iterations of the Random
Chemistry (RC) sampling method were used to efficiently
identify large sets ofN−k malignancies in each test case. RC
3is a stochastic set size reduction algorithm for identifying a
small minimal set of initiating events that trigger some out-
come of interest [32], and was first applied for identifying
N−k malignancies in power systems in [6]. For the reader’s
convenience, the RC algorithm is briefly reviewed below.
The RC algorithm uses a subset reduction scheme
{a1, a2, . . . , afinal}. Subsets of size a1 are randomly sam-
pled from a universal set of N system components until one
such set is found that causes a blackout; if a1 is relatively
large, this typically requires few tries. A set of size ai+1
is then randomly sub-sampled from the preceding set of
size ai until a set is found that causes a blackout (or some
maximum number of sub-samples is tried, in which case the
algorithm aborts), and so on for each subsequent set size in
the scheme.
If ai+1 = ai/c, for some constant c, then the algorithm
requires only O(N logN) time to identify a subset of size
afinal. As in [6], we use c = 2 from a1 down to subsets of
size 20 and then use c = 1.5 down to afinal. A bottom-up
brute force search of all subsets of a given size k is subse-
quently applied (conducted in randomized order, starting
from k = 2), exiting when the first minimal malignancy of
size k = {2, 3, . . . , afinal} is identified.
Repeated sampling with independent RC trials is per-
formed to compile large subsets of N − k malignancies
(ΩRCk ). Risk due to each k ≤ kmax is then calculated using
Ωsampledk = Ω
RC
k in (3) for estimating system risk with (4).
A comparison of risk estimation using RC sampling
vs. Monte Carlo (MC) sampling on a model of the Polish
power system at peak winter load [33] showed that the
RC approach was at least two orders of magnitude faster
than MC on this system, and did not introduce measurable
bias into the estimate [9], [11]. However, these previous
studies assumed branch outages were uncorrelated. Under
that assumption, N − 3 malignancies contribute relatively
little to the risk, despite the fact that |ΩRC3 |  |ΩRC2 |, since
their probability of occurrence is so much smaller than that
of the N − 2 malignancies [9].
In this study, the universal set is assumed to comprise
the set of N branches in each test case, afinal = 5, and
up to 20 sub-samples at each set size were allowed before
aborting an RC trial, as in [9], [11]. The specific set reduction
scheme used for each test case is given in Section 2.5. Note
that kmax < afinal because, with the number of RC trials
performed, |ΩRCk | was insufficient for estimating |Ωk| for
k > 3.
2.3 Copula Analysis for Correlation
Copula functions couple multivariate distributions to the
marginal distributions of individual variables [34]. Given a
set of k random variables, X = [X1, X2, . . . , Xk], where
Pr(Xi ≤ ti) is the marginal probability that branch i fails,
for some threshold ti, then
FX(T) = Pr
(
k⋂
i=1
Xi ≤ ti
)
(5)
where T = [t1, t2, · · · , tk], represents the joint probability
that k branches fail together. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that ti = 0 for all i.
There are numerous classes of copula functions in pop-
ular use. For this demonstration of the method, a Gaus-
sian copula was assumed, but alternative distributions may
be assumed where appropriate. Here, it is assumed that
the inverse stress on a transmission line i is a univariate
Gaussian random variable Xi = N (µi, σi), with mean µi
and standard deviation σi, with the cumulative distribution
function:
FXi(xi) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
xi − µi
σi
√
2
)]
(6)
Given the independent probability pi of branch i going out,
µi and σi are chosen such that when Xi < 0, the branch
goes out. In other words, µi and σi are chosen such that
FXi(0) = pi for each branch i. Without loss of generality, it
is assumed that µi = 1,∀i, and each σi is then solved for as
follows:
σi =
−1
erf−1(2pi − 1)
√
2
(7)
A multivariate normal distribution X = N (µ,C) with
mean µ = [µ1, µ2, . . . , µk] and covariance matrix C is
then used as the copula function to couple these univariate
marginal distributions (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. A visual depiction of the copula method for two components
i and j with hypothetical Gaussian distributions of some performance
attributes, Xi and Xj , which impact whether each component is oper-
ational or in a failure state. The curves on the vertical planes represent
the marginal distributions of each component’s attribute, with the shaded
regions of these curves, (Xi ≤ ti) and (Xj ≤ tj ), representing the
failure state for each component. The shaded gradient on the horizontal
plane represents the density of the joint distribution (copula) of the two
variables, with darker shading representing higher probability density.
The probability mass within the red hatched area represents the region
of joint failure (X ≤ [ti, tj ]), with the red dotted line depicting the
boundaries of this region.
In this study, it is assumed that the correlation between
outages in branches i and j decays exponentially with the
distance between them dij , according to:
ρij = ρoe
−dij/L (8)
where ρo represents the maximum possible correlation coef-
ficient (at distance zero) and L represents the characteristic
length, which controls the decay rate of the correlation; L
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Fig. 2. Change in the correlation between two branches as a function
of the distance between them, assuming (8) with characteristic length
L = 300 km and correlation ρo for branches that are 0 km apart.
can be interpreted as the distance at which ρij reaches ρo/e
(i.e., ≈ 36.8% of ρo) (Fig. 2).
Eq. (8) can be adjusted to represent a wide range of
exogenous common cause events individually, or in com-
bination, by adjusting the parameters ρo and L to align
with data for a particular set of threats. The exponential
decay form captures the spatially decaying nature of earth-
quakes [35], and can approximately capture the impact of
other threats that are likely to be geographically correlated,
such as tornados [36] and hurricanes [37].
The resulting correlation coefficient ρij calculated by (8),
and the standard deviations σi and σj calculated by (7), are
used to calculate the pairwise covariance between branches
i and j as:
cov(i, j) = ρijσiσj (9)
Using (9) to find each element of the covariance matrix C,
the probability density function of the multivariate normal
distribution (10) is used to form the copula.
f(x) =
1√
(2pi)k|C| exp
{
−1
2
(x− µ)>C−1(x− µ)
}
(10)
Integrating (10) over the region in the joint distribution that
represents outages of all system components gives:
FX(0) =
0∫
−∞
0∫
−∞
· · ·
0∫
−∞
f(x1, x2, . . . , xk) dx1 dx2 . . . dxk
(11)
where FX(0) represents the joint outage probability of
k components Pr(X ≤ 0). The multiple-integral in (11)
represents the generalized solution for arbitrary k and is
equivalent to the cumulative distribution function of the
multivariate normal distribution, which can be solved ef-
ficiently in MATLAB using methods described in [38]. In
this work, k ∈ {2, 3}.
2.4 Defining Inter-Branch “Distance”
The definition of “distance” will vary based on the type
of common cause threatening the system. Assuming spa-
tial correlation in branch outages here, without loss of
generality a modified version of the inter-branch distance
metric defined in [29] is used. Branches are assumed to be
straight lines between the buses that form their endpoints.
Given branch U with endpoints (u1, u2) and branch V with
endpoints (v1, v2), let the distance from U to V be defined
as
Dist(U, V ) =
∑2
i=1 d(ui, V ) +
∑2
i=1 d(vi, U)
4
(12)
where d(vi, U) is the minimum Euclidean distance from the
point vi to the line segment U = (u1, u2), calculated as:
d(vi, U) =
 ||vi − u1|| t ≤ 0||vi − (u1 + tm)|| 0 ≤ t ≤ 1||vi − u2|| t ≥ 1 (13)
where m = u2 − u1 and t = (vi−u1) •m||m||2 , as illustrated in
Figure 3.
u1 
u2 
v1 v2 
U 
V 
d(u1,V) 
d(v1,U) 
d(u2,V) 
d(v2,U) 
Fig. 3. Visual example for calculating the distance between branches U
and V with endpoints (u1, u2) and (v1,v2), respectively.
This formulation defines a semi-metric since the triangle
inequality does not hold in some cases. However, all other
formal requirements of a metric are met. Specifically:
1) Dist(U, V ) ≥ 0
2) Dist(U, V ) = Dist(V,U)
3) Dist(U, V ) = 0 ⇐⇒ U = V
The third identity implies branches U and V share the same
endpoints, thus are parallel. ThisDist(U, V ) measure is con-
sistent with what would be intuitively expected when con-
sidering spatially correlated damage. For example, in Fig. 4,
Dist(A,B) > Dist(C,D) and Dist(E,F ) > Dist(G,H).
Using the Dist(U, V ) measure, it is apparent that branch
pairs that form malignancies are much closer together than
those of benign contingency pairs in both test cases (Fig. 5).
This property will exacerbate the effects of spatial correla-
tion on risk of cascading failure.
2.5 Case Studies
This risk estimation approach is demonstrated on two pub-
licly available test cases, modeling the Polish and Western
United States (US) transmission systems.
The Polish test case, examined in previous work on
risk estimation [8], [9], [29], contains 2383 buses and 2896
branches at a peak winter load and is distributed with the
MATPOWER simulation package [33]. The true spatial lo-
cations of branches and buses are not publicly available for
this test case, so hypothetical locations were inferred based
5A              C 
B                  D 
E               G 
   H 
F 
Fig. 4. Branch pairs used for pairwise distance examples described in
the text.
Fig. 5. Distance between the 540 and 564 branch pairs that form N − 2
malignancies in the Polish and Western US test cases vs. a random
sample of 1,000,000 benign branch pairs from each test case. For clarity,
medians are marked with crosshairs and each distribution has been
independently normalized to the same maximum width.
on a graph layout of the grid topology, assuming branches
are straight lines between buses (Fig. 6). This layout was
then scaled to 670× 670 km, the approximate width/height
of Poland, to simulate geographic distances. Some of the
transmission lines were overloaded in the Polish test case
provided by [33], so the adjusted base case described in [8]
was used. Unless otherwise stated, references to the “Polish
test case” refer to this adjusted base case. As in [9], different
load levels were modeled in the Polish test case from 80%
to 115% of the adjusted base case by multiplying all line
loads by a scalar factor and then re-running the security con-
strained optimal power flow, to ensure the pre-contingency
system at each load level is N − 1 secure.
The Western US test case is a synthetic network based
on the footprint of the western Unites States and comes
via the Electric Grid Test Case Repository [39]. This test
case is much larger than the Polish test case, with 10,000
buses and 12,706 branches, and has a more realistic geo-
graphic layout (Fig. 7). As with the Polish test case, some
transmission lines were overloaded for the Western US test
case provided by [39], and so adjustments were made as
described in [8]. Since the case did not include short and
long-term emergency flow limits (“RateB” and “RateC”),
they were synthesized to be 110% and 150% of normal
(“RateA”) limits, respectively.
Independent branch outage rates were not available for
either the Polish or Western US test cases. For the results
presented here, all independent outage rates were set equal
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Fig. 6. Synthetic geographic layout of the Polish test case. Positionally,
this layout is arbitrary and has been centered at (0,0), however, units
were scaled so that the diameter of the geographic layout is roughly
equal to that of Poland (in km).
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Fig. 7. Geographic layout of the synthetic 10,000 bus Western US test
case.
to the mean outage rate of 0.9158 hours per year provided
by the RTS-96 test case [40]. These independent outage rates
were deliberately assumed identical for all branches in order
to more clearly elucidate the impact of spatial correlations
in outage rates, as assessed using (4), for all combinations of
L ∈ {0, 100, 200, 300} km and ρo ∈ {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15}.
For the results shown here, the RC algorithm used the
subset reduction scheme {80, 40, 20, 14, 10, 7, 5} for the Pol-
ish model, as in [6], [8], [9], [11], [29]. For the larger Western
US model, the initial RC subset size a1 was raised to 320
to increase the probability that the initial subset causes a
blackout; thus, the Western US test case used the subset
reduction scheme {320, 160, 80, 40, 20, 14, 10, 7, 5}. We did
1,000,000 RC trials for the Polish test case and 704,400 RC
trials for the Western US model; fewer RC trials were used
for the larger test case because computation time was much
higher than for the Polish model (averaging 9.5 seconds per
RC trial for the Western US model vs. 2.35 seconds for the
Polish model, on an Intel Core i5-3470 CPU @ 3.2GHz with
68 GB of RAM).
2.6 Estimating |Ωk|
As described in Section 2.1, this approach to risk estima-
tion requires an estimate of the total number of N − k
malignancies |Ωk|, for k ≤ kmax. There was no need to
estimate |Ω2|, since RC sampling identified the complete set
of N −2 malignancies Ω2 in both test cases, as evidenced by
the flattening in the accumulation curves (Fig. 8 (top)), and
later verified through brute force search for the Polish test
case. The set of unique N − 2 malignancies was complete
after only 5,090 non-unique N − 2 malignancies had been
found by RC sampling in the Polish test case (of 4,191,960
possible N − 2 contingencies) and after only 9,364 non-
unique N−2 malignancies had been found by RC sampling
in the Western US test case (of 80,714,865 possible N − 2
contingencies).
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
# of non-unique N-2 malignancies found
  
0
200
400
600
# 
of
 U
ni
qu
e 
Fo
un
d
Western US
Polish
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
# of non-unique N-3 malignancies found ×105
0
2
4
6
# 
of
 U
ni
qu
e 
Fo
un
d ×10
4
Western US
Polish
Fig. 8. (top) Accumulation curves for RC sampling ofN−2 malignancies
in the Polish and Western US test cases. In both cases, |ΩRC2 | = |Ω2|;
(bottom) Accumulation curves for N − 3 malignancies found by RC
sampling in the Polish and Western US test cases. In both cases,
|ΩRC3 |  |Ω3|.
However, obtaining the entire set of N-3 malignancies
is not computationally tractable in either test case, due to
the sheer size of these sets. It was initially argued (incor-
rectly) in [6] that, if one has already identified i of the
N − k malignancies using independent RC trials, then the
probability that the next identified N − k malignancy has
not previously been found is (|Ωk| − i)/|Ωk|, so one could
infer |Ωk| from the observed frequency with which unique
malignancies were found (assuming sufficient curvature in
the accumulation curve). However, the assumption that in-
dependent RC trials uniformly sample from the Ωk sets has
since proven false. In subsequent studies it was discovered
that the accumulation curves were not exponential (as they
would be if the sampling were uniform), but could be better
fit with a 4-parameter exponential Weibull curve to estimate
|Ωk| [9]. While this non-linear curve-fitting approach works
for estimating |Ω3| in the Polish test case, the Western US
test case is so much larger that there is insufficient curvature
in the N −3 accumulation curve (Fig. 8 (bottom)) to reliably
fit a curve.
It has previously been noted that the frequency of oc-
currence of individual branches in N − 2 malignancies is
heavy-tailed [6], [41]. A similarly heavy-tailed distribution is
apparent in the distribution of occurrences of specific branch
pairs in N − 3 malignancies, in both the Polish and Western
US (Fig. 9).
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Fig. 9. Histograms of the number of occurrences of distinct branch pairs
in unique N − 3 malignancies found via RC in (top) the Polish test case
and (bottom) the Western US test case.
Further examination reveals that the set reduction
scheme used in RC does, indeed, introduce a sampling bias
when sampling from such heavy-tailed distributions. Specif-
ically, the branch pairs that appear in disproportionately
large numbers of N − 3 malignancies are systematically
under-sampled by the RC algorithm. To illustrate this, the
20 most frequently occurring branch pairs found in |ΩRC3 |
for the Western US test case were selected, and a brute force
search of all possible N−3 contingencies that included each
of these top 20 branch pairs (requiring O(N) computation
time for each branch pair) was performed. In Fig. 10, the
proportion of N − 3 malignancies found by RC that contain
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Fig. 10. The relation between number of occurrences of specific branch
pairs in N −3 malignancies found by RC (x-axis) and the proportion RC
has found of all N − 3 malignancies that include those pairs (y-axis), for
the Western US test case. Only the 20 most frequently occurring branch
pairs are shown, with the star indicating the branch pair that occurred
most frequently in ΩRC3 (Pairmax).
7each of these branch pairs is plotted as a function of the
observed number of occurrences of the branch pairs in
ΩRC3 . A clear negative trend is present, with N − 3 ma-
lignancies containing the most frequently occurring branch
pairs severely under-sampled relative to N−3 malignancies
containing less frequently occurring branch pairs. While a
thorough explanation of the causes of this sampling bias are
beyond the scope of this paper, here the bias is exploited
to estimate both lower and upper bounds on |Ω3|. (It is
worth noting that, as |ΩRC3 | approaches |Ω3|, the sampling
bias of branch pairs found in N − 3 malignancies decreases.
However, for large networks such as the Western US test
case, it is not computationally feasible to sample more than
a small fraction of the N − 3 malignancies, so the sampling
bias remains high.)
Given that sampling probabilities are unequal, this prob-
lem is analogous to the common conservation biology task
of estimating population sizes via mark-and-recapture sur-
veys in closed populations with heterogeneous sampling
probabilities. There are numerous techniques that have been
developed for this kind of problem [42]. Here, Chao’s
method [43] is used, because it is known to be particu-
larly robust to heterogeneous sampling probabilities. In the
power system context, the “population” under considera-
tion is Ωk, the set of all N −k malignancies. Chao’s estimate
is calculated as |Ω3|Chao = |ΩRC3 | + n21/(2n2), where n1 is
the number of N−3 malignancies found exactly once by RC
sampling and n2 is the number of N−3 malignancies found
exactly twice by RC sampling. Chao’s method produces a
lower-bound on the population size within a fixed confi-
dence interval [43], so it is assumed that |Ω3|Chao ≤ |Ω3|.
An upper-bound on |Ω3| can be estimated by taking
advantage of the two observations demonstrated above:
(i) certain branch pairs appear disproportionately often in
N − 3 malignancies (Fig. 9), and (ii) the most frequently
occurring branch pairs are under-sampled, relative to less
frequent branch pairs (Fig. 10). Based on these observations,
the Random Chemistry Proportional (RCP) method is pro-
posed as a way to estimate an upper bound on |Ω3|, as
follows: (i) apply RC sampling for a sufficient number of
trials such that the identity of the most frequently occurring
branch-pair (Pairmax) in the N − 3 malignancies of the
growing set ΩRC3 becomes stable (for the Western US test
case, Pairmax, indicated by the star in Fig. 10, became stable
after about 7000 RC trials), (ii) perform a brute force search
of all possible N − 3 contingencies that include Pairmax
(this requires only O(N) simulations) to determine the true
number of N − 3 malignancies that include Pairmax, (iii)
compute what proportion of all N − 3 malignancies that
include Pairmax were found by RC sampling, and finally
(iv) we estimate the total number of N − 3 malignancies
(referred to as |Ω3|RCP ) by assuming that all other less-
frequently occurring branch-pairs have found this same pro-
portion of the total number of N − 3 malignancies in which
they occur. Assuming that Pairmax is under-sampled, this
method provides an overestimate, and hence an upper-
bound, on |Ω3|; i.e., it is expected that |Ω3|RCP > |Ω3|.
As the number of N − 3 malignancies found by RC
sampling increases, |Ω3|Chao and |Ω3|RCP can be seen to
be converging (Fig. 11), thus increasing the confidence in
these as lower and upper bounds on the true value of |Ω3|.
Risk estimates are calculated for the rightmost values of
|Ω3|Chao and |Ω3|RCP shown in Fig. 11, to obtain approx-
imate bounds on risk due to N − 3 malignancies for the
Western US test case.
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Fig. 11. The accumulation curve of N − 3 malignancies found by RC
is displayed below the lower-bound (Chao’s method) and upper-bound
(RCP method) estimates of |Ω3| for the Western US test case.
Similar approaches could conceivably be applied for
estimating |Ωk| for k > 3, however in this study |ΩRC4 | and
|ΩRC5 | were insufficient to support this.
3 RESULTS
3.1 Set sizes of Ω2 and Ω3
Brute force search was used to verify that RC sampling
found all N − 2 malignancies in the Polish base test case,
with |Ω2| = 540. It is assumed that RC sampling also
found all N − 2 malignancies in the Western US test case
with |Ω2| = 564, since the accumulation curve became
flat (Fig. 8(top)). Using the non-linear curve-fitting method
of [9], |Ω3| is estimated to be ≈ 6.4 × 104 in the Polish
test case at the base load. Using the Chao lower-bounding
method [43] and the RCP upper-bounding method (de-
scribed in Section 2.6), it is estimated that 2.0×105 ≤ |Ω3| <
2.9× 105 in the Western US test case.
3.2 Impact of N −2 Correlation and Load Level on Risk
As shown in prior work [8], [9], the load levels on the Polish
grid can greatly affect the vulnerability of the network to
cascading power failure due toN−2 malignancies. As noted
in [9], risk varies non-linearly and non-monotonically with
load, in part due to variations in the proximity of generation
to demand that result from optimal power flow dispatch
at different load levels. Risk actually tends to drop at very
high load levels because the security constrained optimal
power flow results in more local generation, thus reducing
the flow on critical long-distance transmission lines that can
participate in many N − k malignancies when overloaded.
For a direct comparison to the results presented in [9], the
impact of spatial correlation in N − 2 malignancies on risk
was assessed as a function of load in the Polish test case.
Changes in the system risk as a function of load at
L = 300 km (the longest characteristic correlation length
tested) for 3 values of ρo are illustrated in Fig. 12. Risk
8Fig. 12. Risk of cascading blackouts posed by spatially-correlated N −2
malignancies with a fixed characteristic length (L = 300 km) and varying
values of maximum correlation ρo for load levels from 80%-115% of the
Polish base test case.
increased faster than linearly as a function of linearly in-
creasing ρo, at each of the given load levels. The largest per-
centage increase in system risk occurred at load level 114%,
while the greatest absolute increases in risk occur between
load levels of 97%-112%, where there are the most N − 2
malignancies. In general, while introducing correlation in
initiating outages magnifies the risk of cascading blackouts,
it does not fundamentally alter the overall shape of the risk
curve as a function of load at L = 300 km.
When ρo = 0.15 (the largest ρo tested) and L was varied
from 0 to 300 km, results were superficially similar to those
in Fig. 12, in that higher correlation increases risk without
changing the overall shape of the risk curve as a function
of load. As was the case when L was fixed, the largest per-
centage increase in system risk was found to occur at load
level 114%, and greatest absolute increases in risk occured
between load levels of 97%-112%. However, in this case risk
increases slower than linearly with linear increases in L,
with the largest increases occurring for intermediate values
of L (Fig. 13). This occurs because increasing L beyond a
certain point has diminishing impact on correlation, as L
approaches the radius of the network.
The super-linear increases in risk as a function of ρo and
sub-linear increases in risk as a function of L at the base
load are clearly illustrated in Fig. 14.
3.3 Risk from N − 2 and N − 3 Malignancies
Risk of cascading blackouts posed by N − 2 and N − 3
malignancies was computed for both the Polish base test
case and the Western US test case, over all values of L and
ρo tested, using the set size estimates given in Sec. 3.1.
For the Polish test case (Table 1), the increase in esti-
mated risk due to spatial correlation ranges from 149% for
the most modest level of correlation tested (L = 100 km,
ρo = 0.05) to 582% in the most extreme case tested (L = 300
km, ρo = 0.15), relative to the uncorrelated case.
For the Western US test case, (Table 2), the increase in
lower (upper) bounds on risk estimates varied from 129%
Fig. 13. Risk of cascading blackouts posed by spatially-correlated N −2
malignancies with a fixed maximum correlation (ρo = 0.15) and varying
values of characteristic length L (in km) for load levels from 80%-115%
of the Polish base test case.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Characteristic Length (L), for fixed 
o
 = 0.15
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Varying L
Varying 
o
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
Max. correlation (
o
), for fixed L = 300
To
ta
l S
ys
te
m
 R
isk
 (M
W
)
Fig. 14. Comparing change in risk of cascading blackouts for varying L
(in km) with ρo fixed at 0.15 (top x-axis) vs. varying ρo with L fixed at
300 km (bottom x-axis) for the Polish base test case.
(130%) for the most modest level of correlation tested (L =
100 km, ρo = 0.05) to 428% (456)% in the most extreme case
tested (L = 300 km, ρo = 0.15), relative to the uncorrelated
case.
For both test cases, the general effect of L and ρo on risk
that is described in Section 3.2 also holds in these results.
That is, risk tends to grow faster than linearly with respect
TABLE 1
Risk Attributable to N − 2 and N − 3 Malignancies in the Polish Test
Case for Varying Levels of Spatial Correlation.
L (km)
ρo 0 100 200 300
0.00 0.0394 - - -
0.05 - 0.0586 0.0675 0.0720
0.10 - 0.0876 0.1142 0.1290
0.15 - 0.1314 0.1918 0.2293
9TABLE 2
Estimated Lower Bounds (LB) and Upper Bounds (UB) on Risk
Attributable to N − 2 and N − 3 Malignancies in the Western US Test
Case for Varying Levels of Correlation.
L (km)
ρo 0 100 200 300
0.00
LB
UB
0.0654
0.0665
- - -
0.05
LB
UB
-
0.0846
0.0864
0.0950
0.0974
0.1019
0.1048
0.10
LB
UB
-
0.1148
0.1181
0.1444
0.1502
0.1654
0.1735
0.15
LB
UB
-
0.1631
0.1701
0.2293
0.2445
0.2801
0.3036
to ρo and slower than linearly with respect to L. The larger
proportionate increases in the Polish test case, relative to the
Western US test case, occur because the average distance
between branches in malignancies are shorter than in the
Western US test case (Fig. 5), thus magnifying the impacts
of spatial correlation.
3.4 Relative Risk of N − 2 vs.N − 3 Malignancies
It is expected that N − 3 malignancies will contribute more
to risk when there is spatial correlation in initiating outages,
but it is not clear to what degree. There are several factors
that could potentially disproportionately affect the impact of
N−3 malignancies on risk when there is spatial correlation,
relative to that of N − 2 malignancies, including: (i) size of
blackouts caused by N − 3 vs. N − 2 malignancies; (ii) the
independent probability of branch outages inN−3 vs.N−2
malignancies; (iii) the distance between branches in N − 3
vs. N − 2 malignancies. These factors are each discussed in
more detail below.
3.4.1 Blackout Sizes
If the sizes of blackouts resulting from N − 3 malignancies
were larger than N − 2 malignancies, this could dispropor-
tionately increase the relative contribution of N − 3 malig-
nancies to risk when spatial correlation is present. However,
we have observed that the sizes of cascading blackouts tend
to follow similarly shaped distributions, independent of the
number of component outages in the triggering event, due
to similar patterns of network separation. This is illustrated
by the distributions of blackout sizes (as estimated by DC-
SIMSEP) caused by all N − 2 malignancies, and the subsets
of identified N − 3 malignancies found by RC sampling,
for both the Polish and Western US test cases (Fig. 15). In
both test cases, the median blackout size for the identified
N − 3 malignancies was actually lower than those caused
by the N − 2 malignancies. Specifically, for the Polish test
case, the median blackout size caused byN−2 malignancies
was 7,624 MW vs. 3,372 MW for those caused by identified
N −3 malignancies. In the Western US test case, the median
blackout size from N − 2 malignancies was 10,473 MW
whereas from the N − 3 malignancies it was 10,382 MW.
These patterns and trends continue in the identified sets of
N − 4 and N − 5 malignancies (Fig. 15).
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Fig. 15. Distributions of blackout sizes (in total MW load shed) caused
by all N − k malignancies (2 ≤ k ≤ 5) found by RC sampling, for the
Polish and Western US test cases. For clarity, medians are marked with
crosshairs and each distribution has been independently normalized to
the same maximum width.
3.4.2 Independent Branch Outage Rates
In this study, independent outage rates were assumed to be
homogeneous for all branches. However, in a real system
the distribution of independent outage rates will be hetero-
geneous. If branches that are typically involved in N − 3
malignancies are independently more likely to fail than
those involved in N − 2 malignancies, this could inflate the
relative risk of N − 3 malignancies when spatial correlation
is present. While there is no obvious rationale for why
this might be true, the observation that branches that occur
frequently in N − 2 malignancies also appear frequently in
N − 3 malignancies is indirect evidence against this. For
example, in the Polish network, 8 of the 10 most frequently
occurring branches in N − 2 and N − 3 malignancies are
shared, accounting for 44% and 24% of all N − 2 and N − 3
malignancies found, respectively. Likewise, for the Western
US test case, 9 of the 10 most frequently occurring branches
in N − 2 malignancies are also in the top 10 most frequently
occurring N − 3 malignancies, accounting for 49% and 29%
of all N − 2 and N − 3 malignancies, respectively.
3.4.3 Distance Between Branches
The distance between branches in N − 3 vs. N − 2 malig-
nancies will obviously impact the degree to which spatial
correlation will increase their relative contributions to risk.
In both the Polish and Western US test cases, median dis-
tances between all pairs of branches occurring in identified
N − k malignancies increases with k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} (Fig. 16).
Specifically, in the Polish test case the median distances
between pairs of branches were 76.1 km and 121.8 km, in
N − 2 and N − 3 malignancies, respectively; in the Western
US test case the medians were 169.4 km and 494.6 km in the
N − 2 and N − 3 malignancies, respectively. This helps to
mitigate the increase in relative risk from N − 3 vs. N − 2
malignancies that occurs as a result of spatial correlation.
3.4.4 Comparing Relative Risk with Correlation
For the Polish test case, < 1% of risk can be attributed to
N − 3 malignancies when there is no correlation whereas
under the highest level of correlation considered (L = 300
km, ρo = 0.15), the share of risk associated with N − 3
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Fig. 16. Distributions of pairwise distances among branches in all N − k
malignancies (2 ≤ k ≤ 5) identified by RC sampling, for the Polish and
Western US test cases. For clarity, medians are marked with crosshairs
and each distribution has been independently normalized to the same
maximum width.
malignancies rises to around 9% (Fig. 17). Similarly, for the
Western US test case, N−3 malignancies account for 3%-5%
of risk when there is no correlation, but between 16%-24%
under the maximal correlation (L = 300 km, ρo = 0.15)
considered (Fig. 18).
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Fig. 17. Estimated percentage of risk attributable to N − 3 malignancies
vs. N − 2 malignancies for the Polish Test Case under varying levels of
correlation, including all combinations of L ∈ {0, 100, 200, 300} km and
ρo ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15}.
4 DISCUSSION
Previous research into cascading failure risk demonstrated
that N − 3 malignancies constitute a relatively low propor-
tion of risk compared to N − 2 malignancies, assuming ini-
tiating branch outage independence [9]. This suggests that,
if initiating outages are generally caused by independent
events, limiting risk analysis to the more computationally
tractableN−2 malignancies may be sufficient to capture the
majority of risk. However, in reality, common causes such
as relay failures, weather disturbances, earthquakes, fire,
or spatially localized terrorist attacks may trigger multiple
near-simultaneous outages in geographic proximity that
could potentially result in cascading blackouts. For these
cases an assumption of independence will under-estimate
cascading blackout risk.
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Fig. 18. Shaded regions represent bounded estimates on the per-
centage of risk attributable to N − 3 malignancies vs. N − 2 malig-
nancies for the Western US Test Case under varying levels of cor-
relation, including all combinations of L ∈ {0, 100, 200, 300} km and
ρo ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15}.
This paper presents a method that uses copula analysis
as a flexible, customizable approach for incorporating corre-
lation into risk calculations, building on preliminary work
presented in [29]. The impact of spatial correlation in N − 2
and N − 3 initiating outages on risk of cascading blackouts
is assessed in the Polish test case as well as the much larger,
and geographically more realistic, Western US test case.
The Western US test case has over four times as many
branches as the Polish test case, and the increased compu-
tational cost of performing cascade simulations combined
with the substantially larger search space of N − 3 contin-
gencies rendered previously developed methods [6], [9] for
estimating the set size of N − 3 malignancies ineffective.
Thus, extending the approach to include risk from N − 3
malignancies in the Western US test case required new
methods to estimate lower- and upper-bounds on the total
number of N − k malignancies, for k = 3.
The results indicate that when spatial correlation is
present in initiating outages, the relative contribution of
N − 3 malignancies to risk of cascading blackouts increases,
although the increase is partially mitigated by the fact that
pairwise distances between branches in N − 3 malignancies
are greater than in N − 2 malignancies.
It is expected that the impact of even higher-order ma-
lignancies will similarly increase with increasing spatial cor-
relation, even though median pairwise distances between
branches in malignancies continue to increase with k. In
principle, the approaches to estimating lower and upper
bounds on |Ω3| presented here for the Western US test case
could also be applied for estimating |Ωk| for k > 3, given a
sufficient number of RC trials. We are currently exploring
these and other methods on large synthetic networks to
establish their limitations as a function of network size and
functional heterogeneity. While ignoring higher-order N−k
malignancies when component outages are correlated will
likely underestimate the magnitude of the risk of cascading
failures, estimating |Ωk| for k higher than 3 (or possibly 4)
on large networks may not be computationally tractable,
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due to the sheer number of these high-order malignancies.
Preliminary work indicates that, for the Western US test
case, |Ω4| may be at least two orders of magnitude higher
than |Ω3|.
The lack of accurate data regarding independent trans-
mission line outage rates and the impacts of common
cause events on those rates are an important limitation
to applying these methods in practice. Some such data is
available to industry through systems such as the NERC
TADS database, but these data are typically unavailable for
research purposes. Increasingly, efforts are being made to
better predict how common-cause events such as weather-
related events will impact the grid [44]. Such knowledge will
inform specific applications of the generalized framework
introduced herein.
The methods presented in this paper should work with
any simulator (AC, DC, or even something more sophis-
ticated like a full dynamics cascading failure simulator).
However, more complicated simulation models require
much larger input datasets and tuning these models to get
accurate results is a longer process (see [45], [46] for illustra-
tions of the challenges associated with dynamic modeling of
cascading failure). For example, in order to get an accurate
model from an AC or dynamic power system simulator
one would need to accurately model all of the dynamic
reactive power elements, such as synchronous condensers
and switched capacitor banks, in order to get accurate
results. The impact of these controls is that a system with
large amounts of reactive support will act more like a DC
model with uniform voltage, than an AC model without
reactive support. Since the focus of this paper is primarily
on the computational method for risk analysis, rather than
precise power systems details, we have used a simulator
based on the DC power flow. Based on our experience with
more complicated simulation models, we do not expect that
a more complicated simulator would produce qualitative
differences in the results, although quantitative differences
would result since there are more mechanisms of cascading
in an AC power flow model.
Future work will study the impact of parametric choices
such as distance metrics, correlation functions, and the
underlying branch outage probability distributions. The
method will also be applied to study the risk of cascad-
ing failure in interdependent networks, which are ubiqui-
tous in human-engineered infrastructures [47]. For exam-
ple, coupling between communication and power networks
can substantially impact their robustness to cascading fail-
ures [48], [49]; the method presented herein could help to
quantify the impact of this coupling on risk in the pres-
ence of correlated component outages. As new methods
for measuring the risk of cascading failure in systems with
correlated initiating event probabilities emerge, there will
be a need for comparisons to better understand the relative
computational efficiency and accuracy of these approaches.
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